Problems with Plantinga

by Benny Mattis

The Two-Way Street

In his book Where the Conflict Really Lies, Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga argues that any actual conflicts between science and religion are merely superficial, justifying his claim with the following reasoning:

1. Scientific theories that are inconsistent with Christian belief “do not constitute or provide a defeater for the Christian beliefs with which they conflict” (xiii).
2. If (1), then (3).
3. Thus, the conflict (if any) between Christian belief and the theories in question is superficial.

Plantinga rationalizes the first premise of this valid argument compellingly in the section of his book entitled “Superficial Conflict,” but seems to think that (2) does not require justification; in fact, the premise is not explicitly stated anywhere in the relevant section of the text, despite its importance in his main argument.

Some might find the verity of (2) self-evident, but this is not the case. Consider, as a counterexample, the case where Christian belief constitutes or provides a defeater for the scientific theories in question. In this case, (3) would seem to be false, though (1) would still be true. The conditional in (2), therefore, does not seem to hold. Without rationales for deriving (3) from (1), Plantinga’s assertion of the superficiality of the conflict (if any) between science and religion remains insufficiently justified.

This is not to say that Plantinga provides no argument against the existence of deep science/religion conflict. Premise (1) presupposes that the theories in question are indeed proper science, but Plantinga notes this may not be the case (163). He suggests that the theories in question do not really constitute claims about the actual world, but rather claims about how things seem from a certain perspective (182), in which case there would only be an apparent conflict (that would be appropriately called “superficial,” but also merely “alleged”). These solutions, however, require Plantinga to deny his given premise that they are, in fact, real conflicts between science and theistic belief.

Alvin Plantinga's Adequatio Intellectus Ad Intellectus

In the section entitled "Deep Concord" of his book Where the Conflict Really Lies, Alvin Plantinga counts Hume's problem of induction (that is, the apparent lack of logical justification for inductive inferences about the future based on the past) as not a problem for inductive reasoning, but rather an example of the adequatio intellectus ad rem, or curious fit between human understanding and reality, of whose existence theism is presumably a better explanation than naturalism. "Its success is one more example of the fit between our cognitive faculties and the world," Plantinga claims (295), implying that "the world is in such a way that inductive reasoning is successful" (296). His logic appears to be as follows:

1) "The world is in such a way that inductive reasoning is successful."

2) If (1), then (3).

3) So, there is a "fit between [inductive reasoning] and the world."

This argument is valid; in fact, it may even be sound. However, it is also trivial; in speaking of induction's "success" in general, Plantinga appears to be begging Hume's question of whether, in fact, "there is a fit between [inductive reasoning] and the world." The only apparent rationale for (1) is itself based on inductive reasoning, as follows:

1a) There have been instances where inductive reasoning was successful.

1b) If (1a), then (1c).

1c) There is a "fit between [inductive reasoning] and the world."

Premise (1b), an inductive inference from past instances to the state of the world at all times, is only justified given (3). The conclusion of Plantinga's argument is necessary to justify his premises; he is begging Hume's question. Plantinga here merely shows a fit between intellect (induction) and intellect, rather than between intellect and reality.

Plantinga's Mission: Impossible

In Where the Conflict Really Lies, Plantinga suggests that, even if each instance of content in a mental belief has a neurophysiological (or "NP") property equivalent to it "in the broadly logical sense," it is still rational to speak of specific consequences of hypothetical scenarios wherein "belief B had the same NP properties but different content" (337-338). He appears to justify this by analogy:

1) There are instances where "Philosophers regularly and quite properly use counterpossibles in arguing for their views" (338).

2) If (1), then (3).

3) Therefore, Plantinga's use of a counterpossible in his response is rational.

This argument is valid, and Plantinga justifies (1) with the example of the dualist-materialist debate; either dualism or materialism is necessarily false, but debaters on both sides rationally discuss what would happen if their opponents were correct (despite thinking that such situations are counterpossible) (339). The verity of premise (2), however, is dependent on whether Plantinga's use of a counterpossible is relevantly similar to such examples, and, in fact, it is not.

Given dualism, it would be a direct contradiction to speak of what happens given materialism, and hence irrational. Debating with materialists, however, the dualist must argue as if dualism were not given--to do otherwise would be begging the question. Likewise, given that content is equivalent to a neurophysiological property, it is as rational to say "the same content but different NP properties" as it is to say "the same content but not the same content," from which anything follows. However, the materialist does not have to argue as if this equivalence were not given, because it is not what is up for debate; what is up for debate in Plantinga's discussion is the probability of certain states of affairs given materialism, naturalism, and evolution.

Plantinga attempts to clarify his point by succinctly asserting that "clearly...it is in virtue of its neurophysiological properties that [a belief] B causes [an action] A...It isn't by virtue of having that particular content." However, given that content is logically equivalent to its actual correlative NP properties, then once again, Plantinga's rationale for (1) is an outright contradiction.

The Indication of Belief

Premise (1) of Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN) depends heavily on his assertion that, as he writes in Science and Religion, "indication is not belief...and accurate indication need not be accompanied by true belief. As long as the indication is accurate, the belief content can be anything whatsoever" (70). Plantinga defends these claims with examples, including one involving a frog that reflexively flicks its tongue out to catch a nearby insect:

1) Accurate indication is necessary for the frog's survival (69).

2) True belief is not necessary for the frog's survival (69).

3) So, "indication is not belief...and accurate indication need not be accompanied by true belief." (70).

The first clause of (3) seems to follow from (1) and (2), but it does not follow from that fact that accurate indication could be accompanied by false beliefs, or that the naturalist has any reason to think that beliefs in general on naturalism are not truth-aimed.

Premise (3) is also vague. Plantinga's claim that "indication is not belief" can mean one of two things:

B1) All indication is such that it is not belief.

B2) Not all indication is such that it is belief.

(B2) follows from (1) and (2); (B1) does not. The principle of charity thus demands us to assume that Plantinga was referring to (B2). Now consider the proposition that belief is actually a type of indicator:

B3) Some indication is belief, and all belief is indication.

This proposition is perfectly compatible with (B2), the conclusion of Plantinga's thought experiment with the frog. However, if beliefs (and the other cognitive faculties in question) are a type of indicator, and indicators in general tend to be accurate given evolution, then the reliability of our cognitive faculties, given that we have cognitive faculties, is highly probable given naturalism, materialism, and evolution. This does, in fact, seem like a quite sensible way of looking at beliefs--it appears, then, that the naturalist really ought to believe in the reliability of their cognitive faculties, even given their unguided origins.

Work Cited

Plantinga, Alvin. Where the Conflict Really Lies. Oxford: Oxford University Press,

2011. Print.