Free Materials

by Benny Mattis

It is overwhelmingly evident that human beings are made entirely of physical material.  I think it's also safe to assume that physical material is made of molecules, which in turn are made of atoms, which in turn are made of subatomic particles, which operate in accordance with the laws of physics.  Consequently, reason leads one to believe that human beings operate according to the laws of physics.

Many people find this conclusion disturbing.  They notice that there's "no room" for something called "free will," and if they don't find evidence for this phantasm they may take personal issue with the way the world works.  If they've already boxed themselves into a naturalistic worldview, they might twist the usual meaning of "free will" in a sort of reverse-Wizard-of-Oz tactic: "Don't worry, everyone!  Despite what Newton told you, there's still a mind behind the curtain of deterministic interactions!"  But even Heisenberg's uncertainty principle doesn't save free will; as various commenters on Michio Kaku's YouTube opinion noted, mere uncertainty of action is clearly not the same as freedom of will.

What, then, is it that would really count as free will?  If any being had a will transcendent of material forces, it would be God.  The Catholic Encyclopedia, however, states that God is incapable of choosing evil.  This is further backed up by James 1:13 ("God cannot be tempted with evil" [NIV]) and Hebrews 6:18 ("It is impossible for God to lie" [NIV]), at least for Bible-believing theists.  So God would be bound by his perfect nature.  But how is this any different from the material human, who is free to do anything within his or her natural constraints?  A human is free to try whatever they want--that is, whatever actions to which their neurons are disposed.  They are not free to act contrary to their own neurologically-embodied desires, and they are not free to transcend the laws of physics.  It seems like the search for ideal freedom only leads back to some form of determinism; as Schopenhauer noted, "Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills."

But does this mean that we are totally helpless passengers on a runaway train of atoms?  Does this mean that, as Sam Harris claims in The Moral Landscape, "Each one of us is like a phenomenological glockenspiel played by an invisible hand" (104)?  I don't think it's quite that simple, though I do appreciate Harris's use of funny words to illustrate his point.

I think Harris's incompatibilist view of determinism is incorrect precisely insofar as it is dualistic--and it actually is dualistic.  He compares the brain and the mind to the musician and their instrument respectively, but this analogy subtly separates the brain and the mind into two separate objects capable of existing independently.  If Harris's own monistic view is valid, it is nonsensical to claim that we are being played by our own neurons, because we are our neurons.  We are ourselves agents of change in the deterministic machine.  There is no glockenspiel.

The Transportation Freedom Administration

by Benny Mattis

Benjamin Franklin once wrote that "They who can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety."  A popular right-libertarian propaganda pamphlet entitled Inclined to Liberty: The Futile Attempt to Suppress the Human Spirit posits that "There are those inclined to liberty--freedom of the individual to live his or her life in any peaceful way.  And there are those who are inclined to mastery--permitting others to live their lives only as another sees fit."  In Star Wars Episode III: The Phantom Menace, the evil Emperor Palpatine justifies his reign by promising a "Sehf and secuah societeh;" the virtuous Senator Amidala responds in disappointment that "This is how liberty dies...with thunderous applause."  American culture is teeming with heroic assertions of universal freedom such as these; if I were ever given a choice between the vital joy of freedom and the stagnant decay of mere security, I would hope to choose the former without hesitation.

Fortunately, I don't think I ever will have to make such a decision.  This is not because I plan to live in the wilderness, escaping pesky questions of politics and the other downers of civil society.  It's because the whole freedom-versus-security dichotomy is itself about as meaningful as that of the Quarter Pounder versus the Hamburger Royal.  In politics, freedom and security are the same thing.

Political freedom is the security to act in spite of those who would fight for you to do otherwise.  Freedom to own and trade property property is security from those who would take it by force; national security for the U.S. today is freedom from the rule of distant theocrats.  Freedom from oppression is security from a potential oppressor, and therefore a limitation on their freedom to oppress.  It seems like the will to freedom and the will to security could just be different names for what Nietzsche called the "Will to Power."

Does this mean that the overall increase of freedom, and consequently of security, is impossible on the whole?  Is the whole notion of "progress" actually just various reorganizations of equally oppressive political ideologies?  I don't think so.  The overall power (freedom/security) of a society is increased, for example, with breakthroughs in science and technology, mediated through various methods of education; knowledge is power, and it increases the freedom (to apply that knowledge in the right situation) and security (of knowing how the world works) of every individual in society with sufficient access to it.  A scientifically primitive society will on the whole be less free than an advanced one; a caveman is not free to construct an iPad, regardless of whether he has access to the raw materials necessary.  One could also argue, as Bakunin did, that one is "Truly free only when all human beings, men and women, are equally free;" a somewhat egalitarian distribution of power might then be considered in a way to be more free than an unequal one.

Regardless of these abstract notions on liberty, the apparent similarity of freedom and security in politics raises the question of what it really is that people are defending when they promote one over the other.  It seems, for example, that people often view the movement from freedom to security as a movement from tolerance to totalitarianism.  On the contrary, totalitarianism is the very antithesis of security!  Giving up your right to Habeas Corpus isn't a simple exchange of freedom for security; it is an exchange of every 'normal' citizen's personal security for the increased freedom of certain state officials, in the hopes that they will use it decently.  The caped crusaders of capitalism cry foul at the mention of social safety nets, lamenting oppressive violations of property rights as the desire of the 'lazy' working class for security to be provided by a 'mommy government.'  But what freedom would really be lost?  The freedom to deny a fellow human the medical care they need to survive?  The freedom to beg for charitable donations in the event of an emergency?  These freedoms don't sound awfully different from slavery.

I think that the whole freedom-versus-security dichotomy is basically useless in any serious conversation about political power.  The perspective seems mainly to serve as  justification for authoritarian ideologies, even if the people invoking it are trying to promote liberty.  From now on, though, whenever I hear somebody talking about "freedom," I'm going to try replacing it with "security," and vice versa, seeing if any meaningful difference is made.