11/22/2013 Who Are You?

by Kyle VanderWerf

     What makes you the same person as you were yesterday? Pretty much everyone believes they have an identity, or self, which persists to some extent over time. Or if they don't believe it, they almost invariably will still act as though it's true. This Friday, we will discuss what it means to have an identity. I will present a criticism of the notion that a person has a consciousness or soul or kernel of being or anything that stays constant throughout their life, and from this we will try to reach a more reasonable definition of what determines a person's identity. I will also present evidence that, even though such a thing doesn't exist, a person believing that it does (emotionally, not necessarily intellectually) can help contribute greatly to their well-being, and make it easier to adapt to major changes in their life.

9/13/2013 Upon the Moral Use of Aesthetic Manners

by Melanie Muller

In “Upon the Moral Use of Aesthetic Manners,” Friedrich Schiller discusses his theory of the intersection between Aesthetics and Morality. Schiller postulates that morality is the course of action that proceeds purely from human reason.  He assumes humans don’t have “an evil will, which must be changed, but only a good one, which is weak.” He examines what he believes to be the intersections between the “sensuous impulse,” the “will,” morality and “taste.”

We will discuss the manner in which Schiller uses these terms, and how they relate to Enlightenment ideas. We will then examine the philosophical system underlying Schiller’s essay and discuss his claims. 

A free copy of the essay can be found here:

http://www.colchestercollection.com/titles/chunk/A/aesthetical-and-philosophical-essays/manners.html

Free Materials

by Benny Mattis

It is overwhelmingly evident that human beings are made entirely of physical material.  I think it's also safe to assume that physical material is made of molecules, which in turn are made of atoms, which in turn are made of subatomic particles, which operate in accordance with the laws of physics.  Consequently, reason leads one to believe that human beings operate according to the laws of physics.

Many people find this conclusion disturbing.  They notice that there's "no room" for something called "free will," and if they don't find evidence for this phantasm they may take personal issue with the way the world works.  If they've already boxed themselves into a naturalistic worldview, they might twist the usual meaning of "free will" in a sort of reverse-Wizard-of-Oz tactic: "Don't worry, everyone!  Despite what Newton told you, there's still a mind behind the curtain of deterministic interactions!"  But even Heisenberg's uncertainty principle doesn't save free will; as various commenters on Michio Kaku's YouTube opinion noted, mere uncertainty of action is clearly not the same as freedom of will.

What, then, is it that would really count as free will?  If any being had a will transcendent of material forces, it would be God.  The Catholic Encyclopedia, however, states that God is incapable of choosing evil.  This is further backed up by James 1:13 ("God cannot be tempted with evil" [NIV]) and Hebrews 6:18 ("It is impossible for God to lie" [NIV]), at least for Bible-believing theists.  So God would be bound by his perfect nature.  But how is this any different from the material human, who is free to do anything within his or her natural constraints?  A human is free to try whatever they want--that is, whatever actions to which their neurons are disposed.  They are not free to act contrary to their own neurologically-embodied desires, and they are not free to transcend the laws of physics.  It seems like the search for ideal freedom only leads back to some form of determinism; as Schopenhauer noted, "Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills."

But does this mean that we are totally helpless passengers on a runaway train of atoms?  Does this mean that, as Sam Harris claims in The Moral Landscape, "Each one of us is like a phenomenological glockenspiel played by an invisible hand" (104)?  I don't think it's quite that simple, though I do appreciate Harris's use of funny words to illustrate his point.

I think Harris's incompatibilist view of determinism is incorrect precisely insofar as it is dualistic--and it actually is dualistic.  He compares the brain and the mind to the musician and their instrument respectively, but this analogy subtly separates the brain and the mind into two separate objects capable of existing independently.  If Harris's own monistic view is valid, it is nonsensical to claim that we are being played by our own neurons, because we are our neurons.  We are ourselves agents of change in the deterministic machine.  There is no glockenspiel.